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Abstract
State compliance with international commitments is uneven. However, the perception 
of  which countries will and will not comply and to what extent can be biased. Some 
scholars assume that the U.S. will abide by the India-U.S. 123 civil nuclear agreement, 
which main objective is to supply India with nuclear fuel. At the same time, some other 
researchers doubt that India would honor its respective commitments, namely, to main-
tain safeguard measures in its nuclear facilities. The present study expands the knowledge 
of  the factors affecting compliance within the realm of  nuclear trade by analyzing a 
non-binding instrument negotiated between two asymmetrical actors. Drawing on Peter 
Haas’ compliance theories, the author analyzes the incidence as well as the relevance of  
international institutional and ideational factors which, in combination with domestic 
politics and structures, can influence the actor’s decision to comply. The paper’s findings 
suggest that India can be expected to more fully comply with the provisions of  the treaty 
than the United States. Depending on whether certain institutional or ideational factor 
intervenes, Washington is either not capable or is not willing to comply. Its will to comply 
could be affected, inter alia, by important domestic actors concerned with the application 
of  the Hyde Act, as evidenced during the ratification process. Therefore, contrary to the 
mainstream view, the 123 Agreement neither enables India to achieve energy security nor 
ends thirty-four years of  nuclear isolation.
Key words: India-U.S. 123 Agreement, Compliance, Strategic partnership, Energy se-
curity, Nuclear trade
Resumen
El cumplimiento del Estado con los compromisos internacionales no siempre es parejo; 
es posible sesgar la apreciación de qué países van a cumplirlos y cuáles no, y en qué me-
dida. Algunos estudiosos suponen que los EE.UU. cumplirán el Acuerdo nuclear civil 
123, firmado con la India y cuyo principal objetivo es suministrar combustible nuclear 
a éste país. Existe también la percepción de que la India no cumplirá con sus compro-
misos respectivos, como por ejemplo, en lo que se refiere a mantener las medidas de 
salvaguardia en sus instalaciones nucleares. Mediante el análisis de un instrumento no 
vinculante negociado entre dos actores asimétricos, el presente estudio contribuye a un 
mejor entendimiento de los factores que afectan el cumplimiento de los acuerdos firma-
dos en el ámbito del comercio nuclear. Sobre la base de las teorías de cumplimiento de 
Peter Haas, analizo la presencia/relevancia de los factores institucionales e ideológicos 
internacionales que en combinación con la política y las estructuras nacionales pueden 
influir en la decisión del actor a cumplir. Me parece que podemos esperar que la India 
cumpla más plenamente con las disposiciones del tratado que los EE.UU; dependiendo 
de la intervención de ciertos factores institucionales o ideológicos, los EE.UU., no podría 
o no estaría  dispuesto a cumplir. Su voluntad de cumplir podría verse afectada, entre 
otras cosas por importantes actores nacionales interesados en la aplicación de la Ley de 
Hyde, como se evidencia en el proceso de ratificación. Por lo tanto, en contra de la opin-
ión dominante, el Acuerdo 123 no le permite a la India lograr la seguridad energética ni 
termina con treinta y cuatro años de aislamiento nuclear.
Palabras claves: Acuerdo 123 India-U.S, Cumplimiento, Asociación estratégica, Seguri-
dad energética, Comercio nuclear
Resumo
O cumprimento dos compromissos internacionais pelos governos não tem sido equi-
tativo; porém, a percepção de quais os países iriam respeitar tais acordos e quais não, e 
até que ponto, pode ser subjetiva. Alguns teóricos conjeturam que os EUA irão adoptar 
o acordo nuclear civil 123, assinado entre a Índia e os EUA, cujo principal objetivo é 
aprovisionar à Índia com o combustível nuclear. Por outro lado, existe a impressão de 
que a Índia não irá honrar seus respectivos compromissos – como por exemplo, manter 
as medidas de salvaguarda em suas instalações nucleares. O presente estudo, pelo meio 
da análise de um instrumento não vinculativo celebrado entre dois atores dessimétricos, 
tem o propósito de contribuir para um maior entendimento dos fatores conexos com o 
cumprimento dos acordos dentro do campo do comércio nuclear. Na base das teorias de 
cumprimento de Peter Haas, eu analiso a presença/relevância dos fatores institucionais e 
ideológicos internacionais que, juntamente com a política e as estruturas internas, podem 
influenciar a decisão do ator para cumprir. Posso concluir que é possível esperar que a 
Índia aperfeiçoe com maior compromisso as disposições do Tratado do que os EUA. 
Dependendo de alguns fatores institucionais ou ideológicos que interferem, pode ser que 
os EUA não possa ou não almeje cumprir com os acordos; sua vontade para cumprir 
poderia ser afetada, nomeadamente, por importantes atores nacionais interessados na 
aplicação da Lei Hyde, como evidenciado durante o processo de ratificação. Deste modo, 
ao contrário da visão tradicional, o Acordo 123 nem permite à Índia obtiver a segurança 
energética nem conclui com 34 anos de isolamento nuclear.
Palavras-chave: Acordo 123 Índia-U.S., Cumprimento, Parceria estratégica, Segurança 
energética, Comércio Nuclear
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Introduction
The perception of  compliance concerning the India- U.S. 123 “agreement”1 
is biased. It is assumed as a matter of  fact that the U.S. will comply with 
its energy security-related non-binding commitments. Conversely, there is 
a widespread perception that India may decide not to honor its commit-
ments (Kimball & McGoldrick 2007; Mehta, 2007; Perkovich, 2005:12; 
Talbott, 2005; Thyagaraj & Thomas 2006:369; Weiss 2007:446-457). 
Among them, some tend to believe that India could choose not to abstain 
from conducting another nuclear test or may well choose to violate the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) binding safeguard measures 
imposed on its civilian nuclear plants. Building upon Peter Haas´ theoreti-
cal framework on compliance (Haas, 2000:43-64), and based on content 
analysis of  the treaty and associated documents I offer an alternative in-
terpretation that challenges the mainstream view. In other words, I argue 
that the U.S. may choose not to comply, whereas India could be institu-
tionally and ideationally more constrained to do so. 
The India-U.S. cooperation agreement concerning peaceful uses of  nucle-
ar energy2 has been portrayed by authorities and scholars from both countries 
as a turning point in the U.S.-India diplomatic relationship (Burns, 2007:135; 
Holmes, 2007). The shallow and ambiguous agreement may lead, however, 
to another period of  estrangement. Both governments invoked energy secu-
rity concerns as a justification to sign it. Nevertheless, they did not include 
a definition of  energy security in the text, which complicates the delimita-
tion of  their respective responsibilities. Additionally, it was not made explicit 
whose energy security the treaty intended to accomplish (Burns, 2007:137, 
143). Nonetheless, a few authors (Iyengar, Gopalakrishnan, Prasad, The Hin-
du, 31 May 2007; Perkovich, 2005; Sharma, 2007:167; Verma, 2007:3281-
3282; Weiss, 2006:21-63) have called into question the feasibility of  the pro-
visions to attain what is considered as one of  the main objectives of  the 
123 Agreement, i.e. to achieve Indian energy security. Scholars on the whole 
1 It would be normal to indicate the shallow and contested nature of  this treaty by enclosing it in inverted 
commas, however since the article is centrally concerned with the analysis of  the treaty per se such a form of  enclo-
sure seems unnecessary. I have rather opted to show the inconsistencies and the flaws of  it.
2 Based on the conditions set forth in section 123 of  the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of  1954. The terms 123 
agreement; India-U.S. civil nuclear agreement; and India-U.S. 123 agreement are used interchangeably
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are concerned with the impact the agreement may have on international law, 
the international non-proliferation regime and the non-proliferation treaty 
(see Gahlaut, 2005; Galluci, 2006; Ganguly & Mistry, 2006:15; Heinzelman, 
2008:4-5; Krepon, 2007:15-17; Talbott, 2005; Tellis, 2006:7; Wable, 2008:2). 
Moreover, there has not been an attempt to theoretically explain the fac-
tors that may affect U.S. compliance with its commitments from a construc-
tivist and institutionalist perspective. In this respect, is the 123 Agreement, as 
stated in the text of  the treaty, the means to achieve Indian energy security 
on a stable, reliable and predictable basis? If  so, what are the factors that may 
influence the U.S. decision to comply with its energy security commitments? 
According to Peter Haas (2000), we know very little about the degree to 
which states comply with international commitments and empirical stud-
ies suggest that national compliance is uneven at best. Since there are nei-
ther well-established patterns of  state compliance nor well-defined expec-
tations for patterns of  compliance on the part of  decision makers; Haas 
suggests identifying the factors that may influence compliance instead (Haas, 
2000:44). The present study contributes to expanding knowledge on the fac-
tors affecting compliance within the realm of  nuclear trade by analyzing 
a non-binding instrument –the 123 Agreement– negotiated between two 
asymmetrical actors –the United States and India–. To do so, I follow Haas’ 
theoretical framework and analyze the presence/relevance of  international 
institutional and ideational factors which in combination with domestic poli-
tics and structures may affect an actor’s decision to comply. The institutional 
factors that were taken into consideration were: monitoring, verification, 
horizontal linkages, nesting, capacity building, national concern and insti-
tutional profile. In the case of  the ideational factors affecting compliance, I 
focus on three factors: conviction, beliefs and learning. 
Although Haas’ theoretical framework was conceived to assess compli-
ance in different areas –including arms trade and arms control regimes– 
nothing precludes its application to the realm of  nuclear trade, because the 
above mentioned factors are also present in the case studied here. However, 
it is important to recognize the possible limitations and shortcomings that 
may arise from the adaptation of  a theory initially devised to explain factors 
affecting a state’s decision to comply with non-proliferation commitments. 
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In this respect, further research is needed to assess the degree of  compli-
ance and the factors affecting compliance in activities in which compliance 
is taken for granted such as nuclear trade. We may assume that American 
nuclear companies are eager to trade with India; however the decision to 
comply is not entirely in their hands. Some other potential avenues for re-
search may include compliance of  developed countries at the multilateral 
level, as well as compliance among asymmetrical actors.
Research design
I followed the structure of  the 123 Agreement text and conducted a content 
analysis of  the energy security commitments contained in relevant articles/sec-
tions of  the treaty. To check the consistency of  what the signatories agreed I 
compared the treaty’s clauses with the provisions of  the Hyde Act, the Atomic 
Energy Act and the IAEA-India safeguards agreement (IISA). Additionally, I 
contrasted those commitments with statements found in Indian and U.S. docu-
ments (e.g. letters and notes exchanged by the legislative and executive powers), 
and with declarations issued by relevant political actors throughout the negotia-
tion and ratification processes. Concerning the actors’ declarations, I analyzed 
primary sources, such as newspapers and secondary sources.
 The paper is organized in the following way: I begin by briefly situating the 
123 agreement within the broader interests of  the strategic partnership between 
India and the United States. Then, following the structure of  the agreement, I 
explain Haas’ compliance theory and, when pertinent, I apply it to an analysis 
of  the clauses of  the treaty and the associated documents. Finally, I discuss the 
implications of  the findings for India’s energy security.
The ‘Strategic Partnership’ between the United States and India
The beginning of  a beautiful friendship
In November 2001 President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Atal Behari 
Vajpayee decided to commit their countries to a strategic partnershi: How-
ever, the initiative would not gain momentum until January 12, 2004, when 
both leaders officially announced their shared vision “increasingly based on 
common values and interests”, and agreed to start negotiations to pursue 
a strategic association in four areas, i.e. high technology trade, civil nuclear 
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cooperation, civil space cooperation (Burns, 2007:135; US Embassy in Delhi, 
2008), and missile defense (White House, 2004). Negotiations culminated 
in July 2005 with the completion of  the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership 
which allowed for expanded bilateral commercial satellite cooperation, as well 
as the removal and/or revision of  some U.S. export license requirements for 
certain dual-use and civil nuclear items (White House, 2005).
Although the 123 Agreement is regarded by Burns as “the elephant in 
the room”, the other three areas of  the Strategic Partnership are also highly 
profitable. Millionaire contracts have already been awarded to U.S. aeronautic 
and defense companies such as Boeing Corporation and Lockheed Martin 
and many more are expected (“Lockheed Martin…,” 2012). For instance, in 
January of  2006, Air India formally announced an order agreement to buy 68 
airplanes valued at more than $11 billion from the Boeing Corporation. The 
operation was described as: “the single largest commercial airplane order in 
India’s civil aviation history” (Boeing, 2008). 
The Strategic Partnership in general and the Civil Nuclear or 123 Agreement 
in particular (Burns, 2007), have been portrayed by authorities of  both countries 
as a turning point in U.S.-India diplomatic relationships. For some, it signals a 
“new era of  trust and cooperation” (Holmes, 2007), and many referred to it as 
the end of  an epoch of  34 years of  nuclear isolation for India. In contrast to 
the school of  thought which argued the 123 Agreement approval would: ter-
ribly damage India’s relations with the U.S., bring international isolation, and un-
dermine India’s economic reforms (Mohan, 2003:90; Narlikar, 2006:59-76), the 
Agreement’s approval may have, in fact, represented the triumph of  the Indian 
school of  thought which believed that conducting nuclear tests would force the 
U.S. to “take India seriously.” The costs India may incur by subjecting its energy 
security to the vagaries of  the 123 Agreement provisions are, however, poten-
tially too high to mark India’s de facto power nuclear weapon’ status.
The Treaty and the associated documents
As indicated earlier, drawing on Haas’ theoretical framework, I sought to 
determine the presence or absence of  institutional and ideational factors that 
may influence the U.S. decision to comply with the 123 Agreement. For that 
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purpose, I conducted a content analysis of  the 123 Agreement text3, as well 
as relevant documents4. To determine possible levels of  compliance, I looked 
for the presence or absence of  following institutional factors: monitoring, 
verification, horizontal linkages, nesting, capacity building, national concern, 
and institutional profile. Regarding the ideational factors, I analyzed wheth-
er conviction, beliefs, and learning could affect a government´s decision to 
comply. Additionally, when it was pertinent, I determined the influence on 
compliance of  domestic politics and structures (Haas, 2000: 43-64).
For Haas, states construct or choose to comply with international com-
mitments, thus questioning the applicability of  the pacta sunt servanda. He 
argues that some of  the treaties are frequently drafted in ambiguous ways, so 
that their commitments cannot be interpreted uniformly. There are countless 
self-interest motivations why states may adopt norms in soft law instruments 
regardless of  any expectation of  successive compliance (Haas, 2000:62). The 
123 agreement is one example of  such an instrument, which is characterized 
by vagueness, ambiguity, and shallowness reflected in non-binding commit-
ments. It is notable that even some U.S. high ranking officials have down-
graded it. For example, in a letter submitted to Congressman Tom Lantos 
in January 16, 2008, Assistant Secretary of  State Jeffrey Bergner referred to 
the India-U.S. 123 agreement as a framework agreement. When addressing 
Lantos question regarding the U.S. right to unconditionally cease coopera-
tion, Bergner answered that the agreement “does not compel [the U.S.to enter 
into] any specific cooperation” (US Department of  State, 2008:21). 
The 123 Agreement preamble recognizes, as a stated fact, the importance 
of  civilian nuclear energy for meeting rising global energy demands in a 
cleaner and more efficient way, thus excluding cheaper, cleaner and more 
efficient forms of  energy (e.g. wind energy, which holds promise for In-
dia). As specified in the preamble, the parties aim to cooperate compre-
3 The agreement for cooperation between the United States and India concerning peaceful uses of  nuclear 
energy (123 Agreement) comprises seventeen articles, a preamble and a definition’s section (article one). Articles 
one, two, four, five, ten, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen and sixteen are directly linked with the commitments of  
the parties. For its relevance to the present study, those are the articles that I analyzed in this section.
4 The referred documents are: The July 2005 Joint Statement; the January 2006 Henry J. Hyde U.S.-India 
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act; the August 2008 Agreement between India and the IAEA for the 
application of  Safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities; as well as other documents exchanged between the U.S. 
Department of  State and the Congress, and between Indian left parties and the UPA Indian government.
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hensively “in the full development and use of  nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes as a means of  achieving energy security, on a stable, reliable and 
predictable basis” (US Department of  State, 2007, preamble). However, 
it is not clear whose energy security the agreement is intending to ensure, 
the mechanisms to attain it, nor its meaning. As a consequence, the agree-
ment is open to misinterpretation; one could assume (wrongly) that energy 
security means the same for both countries and is achieved in the same 
ways. The lack of  clarity, therefore, allows for multiple and contradictory 
interpretations. The parties to the agreement deliberately chose not to de-
fine the most crucial term. As a result, it becomes difficult to determine 
whether the objective is being attained.
In addition, the 123 Agreement specifies the two states wish to coop-
erate on the basis of  equality, reciprocity and non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs and with due consideration for each other’s nu-
clear programs. In the text, it is nevertheless stated that the U.S. seeks 
to enable full civil nuclear cooperation with India, but not conversely. It 
is also stipulated that the parties note “their respective commitments to 
safety and security of  peaceful uses of  nuclear energy” (US Department 
of  State, 2007, preamble). Furthermore, the parties affirm their support 
to the IAEA safeguards system, which they regard as applicable to both 
countries; however no linkages are established between the security com-
mitments imposed on India - in the form of  the IAEA safeguards, - and 
the ways to achieve its energy security.
 Apart from omitting the definition of  energy security, other core concepts 
are absent from Article One of  the 123 Agreement. There is, for instance, 
neither a definition of  what the parties alluded in Article Two as “a strategic 
nuclear fuel reserve” to guard against any disruption of  supply, nor is there 
an agreement on the characteristics of  such reserve. Moreover, the parties 
did not define “disruption of  fuel supply” nor categorized the different 
kinds of  disruptions. The point becomes particularly critical for delimiting 
the responsibilities of  each of  the parties under those circumstances, and 
above all, for ensuring the uninterrupted operation of  Indian nuclear reac-
tors. This affects not only India’s energy security, but also impacts India’s 
responsibilities with both the IAEA and the United States. 
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Bergner, addressing Lantos’ question, recognizes the lack of  a definition 
for “disruption of  supply” and regards the notion that the Indian govern-
ment tacitly agreed on a definition that was not included in the wording of  
the agreement as true. He states that disruption of  fuel supply is “meant to 
refer to disruptions in supply to India that may result through no fault of  its 
own”. In other words, he alludes to those disruptions resulting from “trade 
wars; market disruptions in the global supply of  fuel; and the possible fail-
ure of  an American company to fulfill any fuel supply contracts it may have 
signed with India” (US Department of  State, 2007:8-9).
Scope of  cooperation 
Of  the seventeen articles contained in the 123 Agreement, Article Two is one 
of  the most controversial and ambiguous. As per the agreement text, each 
state is required to enact the accord in conformity with its applicable treaties, 
national laws, regulations and license requirements concerning the use of  nu-
clear energy for peaceful purposes (US Department of  State, 2007, art. 2.1). 
Hence, there are many possible interpretations of  Article Two, Section One, 
including the possibility that both domestic and international legislatures may 
decide to override the treaty provisions. 
In the parliamentarian notes exchanged between the UPA and the Left-
wing parties in the Committee on India-U.S. Civil Nuclear cooperation, the left 
parties voiced concern that U.S. laws would override the treaty. For them, it is 
clear that specified and unspecified U.S. laws such as the Hyde Act and the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Act of  1954, as well as international treaties signed by the U.S, 
but not by India “will directly impinge on the nuclear agreement.” Addition-
ally, Article Two, Section One also means that any future legislation adopted by 
the U.S. will also apply to India. (Left Parties, 2008:19). Contrary to this inter-
pretation, the UPA responded to the left parties, arguing that the only internal 
law linked to the 123 Agreement is the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, a law which 
was amended by the enactment of  the Hyde Act. For the UPA, the Hyde Act 
is only applicable to the U.S. administration and not to India. India’s commit-
ments would derive exclusively from the 123 Agreement. Customary Interna-
tional law –the UPA argued– guarantees that the Hyde Act does not apply to 
India or override the bilateral nuclear agreement (Left Parties, 2008:32).
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Nevertheless, Assistant Secretary Bergner made the opposite argument 
and disagreed with Congressman Lantos. He emphasized that his prede-
cessor “twice made it clear that the 123 Agreement is in full conformity 
with the Hyde Act”. Bergner added that “the [U.S.] Administration is confi-
dent that the proposed agreement is consistent with the legal requirements 
of  both the Hyde Act and the [U.S.-India Peaceful] Atomic Energy Act”. 
Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the requirement for the full-scope safe-
guards constitutes an exception, thus invalidating Lantos claim that the 
123 Agreement overrides the Hyde Act regarding perceivable conflicts, 
discrepancies or inconsistencies (US Department of  State, 2007:2).
According to Haas, a state´s choice to comply may be affected by the 
issue-related context in which such choice is made. The array of  hierarchi-
cal influences on states’ compliance with international obligations, - what 
Vinod Aggarwal refers to as “nesting” - may be of  a conceptual or legal 
nature. ‘Nesting’ is conceptual when it reflects the causal connections that 
state decision makers believe tie together various issues. It is legal when 
choices to comply in one issue-area may be legally prescribed by another 
domain that has legal precedence, or is regarded as politically more influ-
ential. Consequently, compliance with the 123 Agreement commitments is 
at best, contingent on the Hyde Act conditions and on the legal and politi-
cal pre-eminence conferred to it by the U.S. Congress, and ratified by the 
U.S. Department of  State in various statements (Haas, 2000:57). 
 Haas argues that states may engage in three interconnected types of  learn-
ing about compliance. They may learn to comply with specific instruments, 
with related instruments in the same area of  activity, or they can learn about the 
linkage between issues, which may lead them to decide to change their compli-
ance patterns accordingly over time (Haas, 2000:63). Hence, what was declared 
in Article 103b, Section Four of  the Hyde Act, which established the U.S. policy 
guidelines regarding South Asia, including Iran, constitutes an example of  the 
way states learn to connect different issues. Point number four expressly estab-
lished that the U.S. is required to assure India’s comprehensive and functional 
involvement in U.S. efforts to “dissuade, isolate, and if  necessary sanction and 
contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of  mass destruction including 
the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel” (US Congress, 2006). 
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The prior connection become evident in February 2006, when the U.S. 
exerted pressure on India to support its motion against Iran at the IAEA 
(Verma, 2007:3291), thus contributing along twenty six countries to refer 
Iran to the U.N. Security Council. Scholar Harsh Pant, who would seem to 
concur with this assessment, suggests that “India’s traditionally close ties 
with Iran have become a major factor influencing how certain sections of  
U.S. policymakers evaluate the U.S.-India partnership”. The Bush adminis-
tration clearly warned India that if  it decided not to support the U.S. mo-
tion against Iran, the U.S. Congress would possibly resolve not to approve 
the 123 agreement (Pant, 2007:503-504). As a consequence, India had no 
other option than to cede to U.S. pressure, thereby postponing talks on the 
strategic Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (IPIP) (Verma, 2007:3284).
As stated in Article Two, Section Two, the purpose of  the 123 Agree-
ment is to “enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation between the parties 
in all relevant areas.” However, as I will demonstrate in the following sec-
tions, this is not the case. This commitment was also questioned by left-
wing Indian parties, who linked it to Hyde Act Sections 104(d)(Four)(i) and 
104(d)(Four)(B), expressly deny the export of  any equipment, components 
or materials related to uranium enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing or 
heavy water production to India. However, the sole exception to this clause 
relates to materials aimed for a multilaterally plant to be located in India 
(Left Parties, 2007:22). At the moment there is, however, no such plant 
under consideration. To these critics, the UPA claimed that the transfers of  
fuel and reactors were stated in Article Two, Section Two, and Article Five, 
Sections One and Three of  the 123 Agreement (Left Parties, 2007:39).
In contrast to what the left-wing parties alleged, the UPA contend-
ed that the right for reprocessing was secured, as manifested in Article 
Six(iii). According to the UPA, Article Five, Section Two does enable India 
to receive and utilize dual use items (Left Parties, 2007:39). Nonetheless, 
Bergner’s answer to Lantos contradicts what was stated by the UPA in its 
rebuttal to the left-wing parties’ questions. The Assistant Secretary ex-
pressed that regardless of  the stated provisions for the transfer of  dual 
use items, the 123 Agreement in its character as a “framework agreement 
does not compel any such transfers, and as a matter of  policy the United 
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States does not transfer dual use items for use in sensitive nuclear facili-
ties” (US Department of  State, 2007:3). Full civil nuclear cooperation also 
comprises but it is not limited to the “development of  a strategic reserve 
of  nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of  supply over the lifetime 
of  India’s reactors,” and “supply between the parties of  nuclear material” 
(US Department of  State, 2007, art. 2.2), i.e. either source material, or spe-
cial fissionable material.5 These U.S. commitments, which are reaffirmed 
in Article Five, Section Six, are analyzed in detail in the following section.
Nuclear trade and nuclear related transfers 
Articles Four and Five of  the 123 Agreement establish the basis for regulating 
nuclear trade between the parties, as well as transfers of  nuclear material, non-
nuclear material, equipment, components and related technology. As stated 
in the treaty, the signatories are committed to facilitate nuclear trade between 
them, “and where appropriate trade between third countries and either party of  
items obligated to the other party” (US Department of  State, 2007, art. 5.1). To 
put it differently, other countries could assume the duties of  any of  the signato-
ries when it is deemed appropriate, i.e. building upon the theoretical framework 
of  Haas, when the obliged party is not capable to comply.
The U.S. - India 123 Agreement does not impose restrictions on signatories 
to engage in nuclear trade with third countries. Nevertheless, the treaty does not 
contemplate specific provisions for evaluating compliance regarding trade of  
items to which the parties are obligated to supply. With reference to the items 
and the obligations, there is no further elaboration of  what each of  the terms 
means, thus increasing the vagueness and the probability of  non-compliance. 
Furthermore, Article Four, Section One stipulates that the signatories recognize 
the utmost importance of  the reliability of  supplies in order to ensure smooth, 
uninterrupted, and efficient operation of  nuclear plants. However, no explicit 
references were made to provide for monitoring and verification measures to 
assessing the parties’ compliance with the trade obligations. 
According to Haas (2000), exact verification of  state compliance may di-
rectly influence state choices to comply. Verification may also indirectly deter 
5 Source material means: uranium, uranium depleted in the isotope 235 and thorium. Special fissionable 
material means plutonium, uranium-233 and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235.
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non-compliance by increasing the likelihood of  detection. Nonetheless, to seri-
ously influence compliance, verification data must be accurate, timely and reli-
able (Haas, 2000:55-56). A salient potential source of  variation in compliance is 
related to the nature of  the issue under regulation and whose activities a state is 
seeking to influence. This is particularly relevant because interests and policy net-
works vary accordingly, as does the ability of  those who will ultimately have to 
change their behavior and will pay for the costs of  enforcement (Haas, 2000:47).
It is not clear, - at least not theoretically, - which classes of  issues will 
have a greater probability of  compliance than others. Haas states that the 
dynamics of  state choice should be completely different by issue-area, as is 
usually the case with the constellation of  policy networks and actors. For 
instance, the political costs of  states enforcing compliance on the private 
sector and individuals are much higher than on parastatals (Haas, 2000:47). 
Therefore, the political costs of  the U.S. enforcing compliance on U.S. - 
based private companies whose capital is in some cases not even entire-
ly American (e.g. Westinghouse, General Electric), could, in principle, be 
higher than in the case of  other nuclear suppliers. In contrast, Russia or 
France would be in a better position for enforcing compliance on the ac-
tivities of  their parastatals (Rosatom and Areva, respectively). Drawing on 
Haas´ theoretical framework, compliance in these cases would be a matter 
of  self-regulation (see table 1).
Within the area of  trade, compliance levels would vary relative to the 
nature of  the products regulated. According to Haas, compliance would 
be lower for dual use technologies and technologies with potential military 
applications (Haas, 2000:52). Article Five, Section Two of  the U.S - India 
agreement contains provisions for, among others, the transfer of  sensitive 
nuclear technology and heavy water production technology provided the 
treaty is amended. As an outcome, such transfers, are neither allowed nor 
envisaged. Concerning dual-use items that could be employed in enrich-
ment, reprocessing, or heavy-water production-facilities, the treaty is more 
than explicit: Transfers “will be subjected to the parties’ respective appli-
cable laws, regulations and license policies” (US Department of  State, 2007, 
art. 5.2). For that reason, as stipulated in the Hyde Act, exports, re-exports, 
transfers and retransfers could be approved only if  the end user is either a 
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multinational nuclear plant participating in an IAEA-approved program, or 
a nuclear plant associated with a bilateral or multilateral program develop-
ing a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle. 
In addition, transfers and exports would be approved only if  pertinent 
measures are in place in the facilities in question to ensure that no sensitive 
nuclear technology would be diverted to any location, site, or program not 
subject to IAEA safeguards. Furthermore, the president of  the U.S. would 
need to determine that such transfers/exports would not contribute to nucle-
ar proliferation, hence allowing him to interpret the clause subjectively (U.S. 
Congress 2006, sec. 104 (A) (B):8-9). Finally, exports and transfers of  nuclear 
and nuclear-related technology to India would be contingent not only on U.S. 
domestic laws, but also on NSG guidelines (sec. 104 (2):7). 
The United Progressive Alliance argues that transfers of  dual-use items 
are not banned in the 123 Agreement, however, that is misleading, because 
- as stated in the text - they depend on U.S. national laws. One of  them is 
the Hyde Act, which clearly forbids the transfer of  such items. The left-wing 
parties confirm this assessment and claim that sections 103 (a) (Five) and 104 
(d) (Four) (A) & (B) of  the Hyde Act do not authorize such transfers (Left 
Parties, 2008:40, 57). As if  this were not enough, the restriction is reiterated 
by Bergner in the letter to Lantos, who adds that the U.S. Administration 
does not aim at negotiating an amendment to the agreement to transfer sensi-
tive nuclear facilities or components of  such facilities to India. Bergner also 
clarifies that it is not the intention of  Bush Administration to transfer, or al-
low the transfer of  sensitive nuclear technology to India outside of  the 123 
Agreement. Furthermore, he responds that even if  India were to build any 
nuclear facilities participant in bilateral or multinational programs, dual-use 
transfers could only be considered under the exceptions granted in the Hyde 
Act. In this way, he rejects the transfer of  such technology to any of  the cur-
rent Indian nuclear plants, regardless of  whether they are civilian or military, 
subject to IAEA safeguards, or not, while recognizing the pre-eminence of  
the Hyde Act over the 123 Agreement (U.S. Department of  State, 2007). 
Article Five, Section Four stipulates that the quantity of  nuclear material 
to be transferred to India has to be consistent with any of  the following ob-
jectives: “use in reactor experiments or the loading of  reactors; the efficient 
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and continuous conduct of  such experiments or operation of  reactors for 
their lifetime, and the accomplishment of  other purposes agreed by the par-
ties.” However, Bergner acknowledges that the agreement does not define 
reasonable operating requirements for the Indian reactors. On top of  that, he 
recognizes that both the Indian and the U.S. governments did not discuss a 
definition (US Department of  State, 2007).
Supply of  nuclear fuel and disruptions of  supply
Article Five, Section Six which establishes the U.S. commitment to supply 
nuclear fuel to India on a reliable basis, lacks enforcement, monitoring, and 
verification measures that assure compliance. It is also neither consistent 
with political statements, nor with the Vienna Convention on the Law of  the 
Treaties. In addition, it assigns responsibilities either on those who have not 
signed the treaty, or exclusively on one of  the parties, thus displaying a lack 
of  reciprocity and commitment. 
Haas argues that even if  a state considers that signing a treaty is in its best 
interest, the political calculations associated with the decision on whether to 
comply are distinct and divergent. Despite a state’s willingness to comply, not 
all states are capable. Technical and political factors affect the choice to comply. 
States, for example, may be deprived of  the technical capacity to fulfill obliga-
tions due to their lack of  competence in developing and enforcing technical 
regulations in accordance with international commitments. If  they do not per-
ceive any possibilities for political retribution for failing to comply with specific 
commitments, states “may well commit to obligations which they know they 
cannot meet…” (Haas, 2000:45-46). That is the case, I argue, with the provi-
sions contained in Article Five Section Six, particularly with those referring to 
the supply of  nuclear fuel to India in case of  disruption of  fuel supplies (iv).
Although the U.S. Administration committed resources by amending its 
domestic laws i.e. the Hyde Act,6 and offered to contribute to adjusting the 
practices of  the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions 
for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, compliance 
with the supply commitments is not guaranteed for several reasons. First, 
6 According to Haas, the amendment of  domestic laws is an institutional factor that may influence 
state compliance.
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the amendments to the U.S. domestic law did waive some of  the restrictions 
on nuclear trade with India, but there was not relaxation of  the rules for 
dual-use items and technologies, or reprocessing rights. The latter aspect is 
regarded as fundamental for the development of  India’s nuclear program. 
Second, the Hyde Act imposed new obligations and regulations on both 
the U.S. administration and India, restricting, for example, the supply of  
nuclear fuel to certain facilities, while linking the 123 Agreement provisions 
to issues outside the scope of  the treaty (e.g. the containment of  Iran). 
Third, the commitment to supply nuclear fuel to India is either contingent 
on technical or political factors, or is simply not granted. 
The 123 Agreement is not the only document characterized by its vague-
ness. It is also the case in the NSG waiver granted to India in September 2008 
at Vienna. It lacks, for example, important definitions, such as the definition 
of  “corrective measures” that India ought to take in consonance with the 123 
Agreement Article Five, Section Six (c) in the event of  a disruption of  foreign 
fuel supplies. Furthermore, the waiver is unilateral as set forth in the provisions 
embodied in the preamble of  the IISA, where the IAEA confers India with the 
sole responsibility to “take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted opera-
tion of  its civilian nuclear reactors (IAEA Board of  Governors, 2008).” This 
highly detrimental provision applies even in cases where India is not at fault (e.g. 
failure of  foreign companies to supply India nuclear fuel). 
Moreover, nuclear trade could terminate if  India decides to conduct a new 
nuclear test. This was clearly stated in the letter to Lantos, and expressed by of-
ficials from the US and other NSG members during the meetings at Vienna, 
where India was granted the waiver (Baruah, ‘Life after NSG’, 2008; Foster, 
2008; Hibbs, 2008). In this respect, Bergner is unambiguous: “The fuel supply 
assurances are not, however, meant to insulate India against the consequences 
of  a nuclear explosive test”. Basing his answer on the provisions contained in 
Article Fourteen of  the 123 agreement, Bergner clarifies that if  India decides to 
test, the U.S. has the right to immediately cease all nuclear cooperation with it, 
including the supply of  fuel (US Department of  State, 2007, ). This assertion 
was also reiterated by Nicholas Burns who claimed that in the event of  an Indian 
atomic explosion, the U.S. has the right, according to the U.S. law, to demand the 
return of  all nuclear fuel and technology exported to India (Burns, 2007:137).
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Irrespective of  whether India conducts another nuclear test, Prime Min-
ister Kevin Rudd from Australia - one of  the major producers of  uranium 
worldwide - has already decided to reverse his liberal predecessor’s decision 
to sell uranium to India until it signs the NPT, thus maintaining its long-
held policy banning the export of  uranium to non NPT signatories (‘Aus-
tralia not to sell uranium to India till it signs NPT, 2008). 
Prior to the ratification of  the 123 Agreement, President Bush declared 
before the U.S. Congress that the fuel supply assurances given to India 
were “not legally binding” (“Bush says N-supply not legally binding; India 
worried,” 2008). To clarify this issue, Congressman Lantos asked Bergner 
whether the commitments made by the U.S. in Article Five were legally bind-
ing. Bergner answered that the U.S. intends to uphold fuel supply commit-
ments stipulated in Section Six of  that article, while recognizing that they 
are unspecified fuel supply assurances. Bergner nevertheless, did not answer 
as to whether India agrees on the commitments deemed as legally binding, 
hence allowing once again for contrasting interpretations (US Department 
of  State, 2007 ). As a consequence, regardless of  the changes enacted in U.S. 
domestic legislation and the U.S. efforts to convince NSG members to waive 
some restrictions on India, the supply of  fuel from countries such as the U.S. 
is either dependent on technical and political factors, or is even not assured, 
as demonstrated in the case of  Australia (‘Uranium to India,’ 2008). 
Notwithstanding the US´s good intentions to help India, compliance is of-
ten hindered due to legal, political and technical reasons. Among other things, 
the U.S. offered to assist India in three ways: by negotiating an India-specific 
fuel supply agreement with the IAEA, by supporting it for developing a stra-
tegic reserve of  nuclear fuel to protect against disruption of  supply over the 
lifetime of  India’s reactors, and by convoking a group of  “friendly supplier 
countries” to work towards recovering fuel supply to India. However, as we 
will see, the assurances given to India were insufficient or vague.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), emergency stocks 
and coordinated responses to a supply disruption form a central pillar of  
the energy policies of  IEA countries. As part of  the response mechanisms 
to deal with disruptions of, for example, the oil supply, the 1974 Agreement 
on the International Energy Program required countries to hold stocks of  
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at least ninety days’ worth of  net oil imports, release stocks, restrain de-
mand, switch to other fuels or increase domestic production in a coordi-
nated manner (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2007:162). With due 
consideration of  the different nature of  disruptions of  oil and nuclear fuel 
supply, it is nonetheless indicative, that the 123 Agreement does not stipu-
late either response mechanisms or minimum-maximum levels regarding 
the “strategic reserve of  nuclear fuel” the U.S. “will support to develop”. 
This is confirmed in the letter addressed to Lantos, where Bergner rec-
ognized that no assessments were made concerning the amount of  nuclear 
fuel that would be required for a life-time strategic reserve for each safe-
guarded reactor (US Department of  State, 2007; Kessler, 2008). In addi-
tion, according to Bergner’s response, the agreement did not establish ei-
ther a minimum or a maximum quantity of  nuclear material to be placed 
in India’s reserve. He added that the parameters of  the proposed strategic 
reserve, and of  India’s capacity to purchase nuclear fuel for its reactors, will 
be developed over time. The U.S. would only help India in dealing with dis-
ruptions in its supply if  they occurred as result of  no fault of  its own, such 
as a trade war or market disruptions, but would certainly not help India in 
the event of  nuclear testing (US Department of  State, 2007 ). 
Concerning the second U.S. commitment, i.e. to convene a “group of  
friendly countries” to help restore supply to India (Article Five, Section Six 
iv), Article Thirty-four, Section Four of  the Vienna Convention of  the Law 
of  the Treaties stipulates that “a treaty does not create either obligations or 
rights for a third state without its consent” (United Nations, 1969, sec. 4, art. 
34:13). That is evidently the case for the bilateral agreement signed between 
the Indian and the U.S. governments. Needless to say, the 123 Agreement 
is an agreement which neither Russia, nor France nor the United Kingdom 
have signed. Nonetheless, these countries were expressly assigned that 
responsibility in the wording of  the aforementioned article.
According to Haas, there are a myriad of  self-interested motives, indepen-
dent of  any expectation of  future compliance, why states may adopt norms in 
soft law instruments. States may either concede that they are unable to comply 
but decide to commit anyway, while expecting others to help them to comply. 
States may also signal their commitment in related areas of  national importance. 
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I argue that is the case with the 123 Agreement, as set forth in Article Five, Sec-
tion Six iv. Specifically, I claim the U.S. might have decided to bring India into 
the non-proliferation regime for two reasons: to strengthen George Bush’s po-
litical potential for domestic implementation or because agreement is part of  a 
broader diplomatic culture with which leaders from the state wish to be related. 
The former was evidenced in Bush’s statements regarding his intention not to 
supply nuclear fuel to India if  it decides to conduct nuclear tests, whereas in the 
latter, the U.S. administration sought to project an image that conveys that both 
countries share an attachment to democratic values (Haas, 2000:46). 
Finally, with respect to the IAEA India-specific fuel supply agreement, no 
such agreement is under negotiation nor was it considered in the wording of  
the India-IAEA safeguards agreement (IISA). In the IISA preamble, it was 
acknowledged that “an essential basis for India’s willingness to accept agency 
safeguards is the conclusion of  international cooperation agreements to obtain 
access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations, as well as, support 
for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve to guard any disruption of  
supply…” (International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] Board of  Governors, 
2008, preamble). Thus far, there has been, however, no IAEA commitment 
to procure, supervise and enforce the reliable, uninterrupted and continuous 
supply of  nuclear fuel from any of  its members. 
Parthasarathi (2008) claimed that the US - India civil nuclear agreement 
does not commit the US to guarantee fuel supply over the lifetime of  even 
nuclear reactors of  US-origin purchased by India. He asserted that despite the 
full nuclear cooperation assurances contained in the joint statement of  July 
18, 2005, the responsibility to supply fuel is not assigned to the U.S., but to 
the IAEA, which has no access to or control over sources of  supply of  fuel. 
In the majority of  the countries including the US, nuclear energy is produced 
by private companies, which are not directly regulated by international law or 
international organizations. International law applies to states but never to pri-
vate entities. Consequently, it is the state that exclusively holds legal power over 
private companies. Kellman argues that even assuming that states were willing 
to accept binding IAEA authority over their nuclear activities, the IAEA would 
not be able to demand private companies to implement specific tasks concern-
ing nuclear materials (Kellman, 2000:495).
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France, whose main producer of  nuclear energy - Areva - is to a large 
extent state-owned, constitutes the only exception within the IAEA who 
granted India limited long-term nuclear fuel supply assurances. In Septem-
ber 18, 2008, promptly after India was granted the NSG waiver, Ambassa-
dor Jeremy Bonafonte offered India fuel supplies for the full life (approxi-
mately 40-50 years) of  its nuclear reactors. However, this assurance applies 
only if  India buys nuclear reactors from France. Additionally, no supply as-
surances were given for existent Indian nuclear reactors, nor was New Delhi 
granted permission to acquire enrichment and reprocessing technologies 
from Paris (“Buy French reactor & get lifetime fuel,” 2008).
Haas (2000) argues that issues in which many actors are responsible for 
the targeted activities – such as nuclear materials - may induce selective 
compliance contingent on associated political costs for the state (Haas, 
2000:49). That is the case, I argue, for the India - US 123 Agreement, in 
which various actors are either responsible for supplying nuclear material to 
India (American and foreign companies), or for regulating the action (U.S. 
Government, IAEA, NSG). Hence, apart from eliciting selective compli-
ance, the commitment to comply and the delimitation of  responsibilities, as 
evidenced in the 123 Agreement and the IISA, become diffuse.
Table 1, derived from Haas theoretical framework, shows the 
interconnections, areas of  responsibility, as well as the multiple dimensions 
–private/public, domestic/international– that arise between different actors 
regarding an issue which has dual-use applications, i.e. nuclear materials
Haas argues that states would extract compliance more easily from state 
actors than private actors. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect the 
Indian government to award more nuclear contracts to French and Russian 
state-owned companies, as it could assume higher levels of  compliance from 
those governments. Furthermore, there would be political and technical fac-
tors that may influence India´s decision, such as the long-standing history of  
nuclear collaboration and trust between both countries and India. Concern-
ing the technical factors, India’s decision is informed, according to some, by: 
a successful model of  preference for dealing with just one vendor; France’s 
leading expertise (Verma, 2007:3291), and the less stringent regulations from 
Russia and France (Horner, 2008:4; Kaul, 2008; Lakshmi, 2008). 
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IAEA Safeguards 
Article Ten of  the 123 Agreement obliged India to maintain safeguards according 
to IAEA regulations with respect to nuclear materials and equipment. The 
regulation applies to both the materials and equipment imported by India and 
those produced in the facilities designated by New Delhi as civilian, including 
all envisaged nuclear reactors (U.S. Department of  State, 2007, art. 10.1). 
The safeguards consist of  an ample set of  technical measures by which 
the IAEA Secretariat independently corroborates the “correctness and 
the completeness of  the declarations made by states about their nuclear 
material and activities.” Safeguard measures (SM) can be divided into 
three categories, i.e. “traditional measures”, “strengthening measures” 
and “integrated safeguards.” Traditional measures refer to nuclear material 
verification activities conducted at facilities or locations subject to 
safeguards. “Strengthening measures” include measures to be implemented 
in accordance with safeguard agreements and additional protocols. The aim 
of  the “strengthening measures” is to enable the IAEA to draw conclusions 
about the non-diversion of  nuclear material and the absence of  undeclared 
Table 1. Types of  cases by source of  activity and source of  regulation
* As defined in the India-U.S. 123 Agreement: uranium, plutonium, thorium, etc. 
Source: Haas (2000); Examples provided by the author.
Source of  Regulation
Source of  Activity
State & state owned 
companies
Areva, Rosatom, etc.
Private companies
GE,Westinghouse, 
Toshiba,
Hitachi, Siemens, etc.
International 
Organization
IAEA
Nuclear materials* Nuclear materials
Supplier group
Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG)
Nuclear materials Nuclear materials
State
USA, France, Russia, U.K., 
etc.
Nuclear materials Nuclear materials
Individuals/ NGO
ACA, Pelindaba W.G., etc. Non-proliferation Non-proliferation
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nuclear material and unspecified nuclear activities in the state in question. 
Finally, “integrated measures” relate to the optimum combination of  all 
IAEA SM allowing a state to obtain the highest degree of  effectiveness and 
efficiency within the resources at its disposal (IAEA, 2008).
As specified by the IISA, India agreed to subject to SM fourteen civilian 
nuclear facilities,7 as well as the nuclear and non-nuclear material, equipment 
and components produced, used, or processed in or by such facilities. IAEA 
Safeguards agreements are not treaties, nevertheless Kellman argues they are 
considered as binding (IAEA Board of  Governors 2008:4, sec. II, A, par. 11).
Article Ten, Section Two of  the 123 Agreement perspicuously stipulates that 
the safeguarded facilities, as well as the materials and components transferred by 
the U.S. to those facilities, have to be subject to SM in perpetuity. However, as 
stated in the previous section, neither the 123 Agreement nor the IISA –in acute 
contrast to Prime Minister Singh’s assurances– provided for supply of  nuclear 
fuel in perpetuity. Both agreements committed India to establishing a system of  
accounting and control measures applicable to all nuclear materials subject to 
safeguards (IAEA Board of  Governors, 2008:19, sec. VI; U.S. Department of  
State, 2007, art. 6), thus increasing the probability of  India’s compliance. 
Regrettably for India’s –and, paraphrasing Burns (2007:137)–, for the 
world´s- energy security, similar measures to verify compliance of  U.S. energy 
security-related commitments were not stipulated in any of  the agreements. As 
expected, the IISA includes a section to address non-compliances granting the 
IAEA the right to determine if  there has been any non-compliance by India, 
and when appropriate to take “any measures provided for in Article Twelve, 
Section C of  the Statute.” However, this is not the case with the 123 Agree-
ment. It does not contain any formulations to either determine or sanction U.S. 
non-compliance (IAEA Board of  Governors, 2008:20, sec. VIII, par. 103), thus 
reflecting once more, the unequal nature of  the responsibilities contained in the 
agreement.
Haas (2000) argues that direct verification of  state compliance may di-
rectly impact state choices to comply. Verification too may indirectly deter 
non-compliance by increasing the likelihood of  detection. To really influence 
7 India decided nonetheless to exclude eight nuclear facilities, which it chose to designate as military.
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compliance, verification data must be accurate, timely and reliable. Neverthe-
less, verification may not be equally feasible in all cases. For instance, remote 
sensing satisfactorily works with environmental and arms-control-related 
issues, but it works less satisfactorily with trade and human rights (Haas, 
2000:55-56). Hence, contingent on their respective activities and obligations 
undertaken,8 and taking into account institutional factors, e.g. the fact that the 
AIEA is only supervising the responsibilities assigned to one of  the parties, 
India, it would be conceivable to expect a higher degree of  compliance from 
New Delhi than from Washington. 
Despite having been granted the right to trade with NSG members, In-
dia will still need to comply with stringent controls and regulations to im-
port, use, and dispose of  nuclear materials with dual applications. In the case 
of  the US, controls and regulations will certainly apply to transportation of  
nuclear materials, but not to the verification of  the continuous, reliable, and 
affordable supply of  NF to Indian safeguarded facilities. Furthermore, the 
US decision to supply India could be affected by the vagaries of  the interna-
tional market (e.g. trade wars, disruptions in the global supply of  fuel), or by 
technical (e.g. failure of  an American company to fulfill a supply contract) or 
political factors (e.g. resistance from domestic and international nonprolifera-
tion groups). Nonetheless, due to the high costs, estimated at €1.2 million 
per plant on a yearly basis (IAEA Board of  Governors, 2008:2 par. 8), for 
implementing SM to new facilities, compliance in the case of  India could be 
costly but not necessarily unlikely (see table 2). The South Asian state may try 
to comply anyway, and expect to fail while aiming to attract resources from 
international organizations to bolster capacity (Haas, 2000:47). 
Haas argues that institutions play an important role in encouraging com-
pliance and deterring noncompliance through the elimination of  barriers to 
self-interested compliance. What is more, linkages between institutions in-
volved in an issue-area may contribute to compliance. As exposed in the case 
analyzed here, dense networks of  institutional factors, including the number 
of  international institutions involved in negotiations (IAEA, NSG, NGO, 
etc.), and the frequency of  interactions could contribute to stronger levels 
8 U.S.: Supply of  nuclear fuel; India: Non diversion of  nuclear materials.
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Table 2. Likelihood of  state compliance
Source: Source: Haas, 2000.
costly compliance compliance not costly
state is capable 
and willing possible most likely
state is capable but 
unwilling unlikely unlikely
state is incapable 
and willing
state may try to comply but 
expect to fail to attract resources 
from international institutions to 
improve capacity
state may try to comply
state is incapable 
and unwilling highly unlikely unlikely
UPA government (Left Parties, 2008:73).
The implementation of  the agreement 
Even though the 123 Agreement stipulates that “it shall be implemented in a 
way not to hamper, delay or interfere in the nuclear activities of  the signatories,” 
it has the potential to seriously restrict what it is aiming to avoid. The agreement 
purports inter alia to be consistent with prudent management practices for the 
safe conduct of  nuclear activities; to fully consider the long-term requirements 
of  the parties’ nuclear programs and intends not to restrict trade or to hinder 
the commercial or industrial interests of  the signatories (U.S. Department of  
State, 2007, art. 12.1). However, nuclear fuel is neither guaranteed by the U.S. 
nor by the group of  “friendly suppliers.” Consequently, safeguard measures 
could be unilaterally suspended by India at any time, thus risking the safe con-
duct of  nuclear activities and prompting the termination of  the agreement (U.S. 
of  Indian but not necessarily U.S. compliance (Haas, 2000:53, 57). This is 
so, because the American supply commitments are not supervised or regu-
lated by any of  those organizations, and are subject to political choices (e.g. 
to terminate nuclear trade with India if  it conducts another nuclear test). 
Consequently, US noncompliance risks not only the energy security of  India, 
but also world security in the event India decides to unilaterally suspend safe-
guards in response to a lack of  foreign nuclear fuel, as declared in 2008 by the 
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Department of  State, 2007:20). Moreover, no concrete steps have been taken 
to plan the construction of  a nuclear fuel reserve, therefore, India´s long term 
needs were not taken into consideration (Kimball 2007:4; U.S. Department of  
State, 2007:11). Finally, the preeminence of  the Hyde Act over the 123 Agree-
ment may serve as a pretext for imposing economic sanctions (U.S. Congress 
2006, sec. 103 (b) (E) (4); Verma, 2007:3288) on India in case it decides to con-
duct business with Iran (e.g. by participating in the construction of  the IIPP). 
Consultations and the settlement of  disputes. 
Do parties have the same responsibilities, benefits and advantages?
Article Thirteen of  the 123 Agreement, which relates to consultations be-
tween “two states with advanced nuclear technology” who “have agreed to 
assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits 
and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology,” 
does not provide any possibility for arbitration or impose sanctions to address 
non-compliances. It merely specifies that the parties may engage in consulta-
tions at the request of  the other party in cases when any of  those parties do 
not comply with the provisions of  the agreement (U.S. Department of  State, 
2007, art. 13.1 & 13.2). The responsibilities of  the parties, as presented in the 
previous pages are not the same, and the benefits as a result, are not granted. 
In other words, while India agreed to some commitments that are legally bind-
ing and permanent (e.g. to subject all present and future civilian facilities to 
safeguards), the US´ obligations are either vague (e.g. supply of  NF), subject 
to amendment (e.g. regarding sensitive nuclear technology), contingent on its 
domestic laws (dual-use items), or finite (Left Parties, 2008:11).
Monitoring by impartial third parties is considered by Haas (2000) to be 
an important institutional factor affecting compliance. When states or any 
other principal actors are responsible for monitoring the results of  their own 
actions they encounter innumerable incentives for misrepresentation (Haas, 
2000:54). Since the IAEA was not conferred the responsibility to arbitrate 
between the parties, and was restricted to determining when India has 
incurred non-compliances, U.S. compliance appears less likely. 
In this regard, the UPA claims that not having international arbitration 
is not a hindrance. The UPA legislators claimed the 123 Agreement’s ne-
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gotiations gave India a wider margin of  freedom and flexibility than the 
one provided by international arbitration which they deem as contrary to 
India’s national interest. The coalition led by Sonia Gandhi also considered 
the India-US 123 Agreement far superior to the US-Japan 123 Agreement 
because the consultation process of  the former may last up to one year 
(Left Parties 2008:33, 71). Nevertheless, nowhere in the wording of  Article 
Thirteen is it stated that the parties can call for consultations lasting one 
year. Furthermore, if  the European Union and Japan (Haas, 2000:51) were 
granted the right for international arbitration, why not India, if  suppos-
edly- as the wording of  the 123 Agreement implies- it is also considered a 
country possessing advanced nuclear technology? 
Article Fifteen of  the India-US Agreement, which symbolically refers 
to the settlement of  disputes, simply states that any dispute concerning 
the interpretation or implementation of  the agreement´s provisions must 
be solved via negotiations. Thus, it circumscribes the options and subjects 
the final decision to a great array of  domestic and international political 
factors, as well as to the self-interests of  their respective domestic con-
stituencies (U.S. Department of  State, 2007, art. 15). Haas (2000) argues 
that domestic and state-based approaches seeking to explain state compli-
ance with international soft law instruments are insufficient because do-
mestic factors “do not operate in a vacuum.” He ascribes importance to 
systemic and transnational factors, which have “a strong influence on the 
origin of  many domestic factors and the political context in which they 
operate (Haas, 2000:43).” Moreover, the choice to comply is rarely based 
on purely domestic considerations. The choices a state makes are strate-
gic and dependent “on expectations of  others’ independent behavior.” 
In this sense, “domestic groups may anticipate international effects of  
compliance and international factors amplify some domestic forces while 
suppressing others” (Haas, 2000:49).
State compliance with liberal free-trade rules- including the recently liberal-
ized sale of  nuclear material and technology to India- could be encouraged by 
influential companies such as General Electric or Westinghouse, which would 
rely on the Indian market to reactivate their sales. Indeed, the influence of  
these companies could increase by including other actors- domestic and trans-
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national- in their cause,9 as evidenced during the ratification process of  the 123 
Agreement. Back then, American defense companies, which were fully aware 
of  the importance of  the civil nuclear agreement within the general interests of  
the strategic partnership, and recognized the linkages between different issue-
areas decided to lobby along with the nuclear-generating companies.
However, in the event of  an Indian atomic test, the interests of  the 
American companies would probably be met with the stark opposition from 
influential members of  the Congress- particularly the Democrats- the gen-
eral public, and important non-proliferation organizations like the ACA. In 
consequence, the US decision to continue supplying fuel to India would be 
adversely affected (Ghoshroy, 2006). Haas (2000) describes this institutional 
factor as national concern (Haas, 2000:58). By the same token, it would be 
logical to expect other NSG members and non-proliferation groups to exert 
pressure, particularly from Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, New Zealand, and 
China, who expressed serious concerns, from the very beginning, about waiv-
ing restrictions on trading with India.
The duration and termination of  cooperation 
As set forth in Article Sixteen, the agreement is required to remain in force 
for a period of  forty years. It nevertheless provides for supplementary pe-
riods of  ten years. As part of  the provisions, the parties are allowed to ter-
minate the agreement at the end of  any of  the periods of  time mentioned 
by notifying the other party in written form six months ahead of  time (U.S. 
Department of  State, 2007, art. 16).
As per Article Fourteen, if  consultations fail, the parties have the right to cease 
further cooperation. Moreover, they agree to “consider carefully the circumstanc-
es that may lead to termination or cessation,” and to evaluate whether those cir-
cumstances are the consequence of  a party’s major concern about a “changed 
security environment, or as a response to similar actions by other states, which 
9 The main American firms and confederations behind the deal have been: Westinghouse (acquired in 2006 
by Toshiba Corp), General Electric (since 2007 world partner of  Hitachi), and the U.S. Chamber of  Commerce, 
which are looking at $100-150 billion in new business opportunities over the next 15-20 years and have promised 
to create around 250 000 high-tech jobs in the U.S. Whereas in the case of  India, the Indian Confederation of  
Industry is expected to attract $27 billion in investment to build around 18-20 new nuclear power plants over 
the next 15 years. Main supporters in the subcontinent include BHEL, NTPC, Tata Power, Larsen and Toubro.
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could impact [its] national security” (U.S. Department of  State 2007, art. 14.2). 
The wording of  the article would seem to accommodate India’s specific security 
concerns; however, the explanation Bergner gave to Lantos concerning those 
circumstances reveals the US intention not to comply. 
In the letter addressed to Congressman Lantos, Bergner specified what the 
circumstances may be, despite the fact these circumstances are not spelled out in 
the 123 agreement itself. Such circumstances would include, but are not limited 
to: the detonation of  a nuclear weapon, a material violation of  the 123 Agree-
ment or the termination, abrogation or material violation of  IAEA safeguards. 
In such circumstances he declared, the provisions of  Article Fourteen could be 
invoked and their exercise would render Article Five, Section Six inapplicable. 
This would flagrantly contradict Article Sixteen, Section Three, which specifically 
requires that Article Five, Section Six (c) related to the implementation of  SM 
continue even in the absence of  nuclear fuel supply.
 In other words, the US would not honor its commitments to supply NF 
to India and guard against any disruption of  fuel supplies. This implies that the 
US, for example, would not convoke a group of  “friendly countries” with India 
to restore supply to New Delhi, nor support an Indian effort to develop a stra-
tegic reserve (U.S. Department of  State, 2007, :9). Bergner unambiguously stated 
that Article Fourteen of  the 123 Agreement enables the US to terminate nuclear 
cooperation and demand the return of  all equipment and materials subject to 
the agreement. Furthermore, he claimed that to take those actions “…would be 
within the discretion of  the US” (US Department of  State, 2007:20), therefore 
his declarations contradict the aim of  Article Fourteen, Section Eight, i.e. not to 
derogate the rights of  the parties related to ES commitments under Article Five, 
Section Six. (U.S. Department of  State, 2007, art. 14.8).
The assistant secretary of  state justified the action by linking the 123 
Agreement provisions to section 123 of  the Atomic Energy Act, A number 
Four, where it is stipulated that the U.S. can exercise such a right if  “the co-
operating party detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abro-
gates and agreement providing for IAEA safeguards” (Office of  the General 
Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2002, sec. 123 (a) (4), pp.1-52, 
vol. 1, no. 6). Again, this shows how US domestic laws override the 123 
agreement. This provision however, does not apply to nuclear weapon states. 
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Consequently, we could assume- contrary to the Indian mainstream opinion- 
that the US is not at all recognizing India as such, nor conferring it the same 
benefits and advantages granted to “other leading countries with advanced 
nuclear technology” (US Department of  State, 2007, art. 13.1).
The 123 Agreement prescribes that “a crucial factor for seeking termina-
tion will be whether the IAEA Board of  Governors has made a finding of  
non-compliance” (US Department of  State, 2007, art. 14.3), a clause seem-
ingly designed to sanction India but not the US. This would apply unless In-
dia, hypothetically decided to terminate cooperation with the US on the basis 
of  US noncompliance determined by the IAEA but circumscribed to the 
correct application of  SM to US civilian nuclear facilities. That is, of  course, 
absent in the wording of  the 123 agreement.
Finally, a US decision to terminate nuclear trade with India could be linked 
to “an ethical or moral sense of  obligation or a causal belief  in how the world 
works and how a country’s interests will be affected by compliance.” In the 
case under consideration, the US could stop trading with India to impede 
nuclear proliferation due to the violation of  safeguard measures. For Haas 
(2000), the collective understandings in the form of  moral norms would also 
lead to the choice on whether to comply (Haas, 2000:62). 
Conclusions
The India-US 123 Agreement, in contrast to what was declared by many au-
thorities and scholars from India and the United States, does not end thirty-
four years of  “nuclear isolation” for India. Moreover, it does not enable In-
dia to achieve energy security on a stable, reliable and predictable basis. The 
123 Agreement is an unequal, vague and non-binding treaty that does not 
accomplish its aim, namely to enable full civil nuclear cooperation between 
the parties. An analysis of  the relevant documents and statements revealed 
that the commitments subscribed to by the US are either regarded by the 
authorities of  that country as non-binding, or are viewed in such a way as 
to be contradictory to what was stated in the text. Finally, international in-
stitutional and ideational factors in combination with domestic politics and 
structures may affect the US decision to comply with the energy security 
assurances of  the 123 Agreement.
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It is a fallacy to argue that nuclear energy will enable a country with the 
characteristics and needs of  India to achieve energy security. The meager 5 
percent of  participation expected by 2030 will not enable India to substan-
tially diversify its energy resources or its energy mix. As a matter of  fact, the 
diversification of  India’s energy mix through nuclear energy may even im-
pede progress in important energy projects such as the Iran- Pakistan- India 
pipeline. In the 2005 joint statement, President Bush and Prime Minister 
Singh committed to developing and deploying more efficient, affordable 
and diversified energy technologies. However, as evidenced by the analy-
sis of  the strategic partnership, and especially the 123 agreement, energy 
cooperation was restricted to nuclear energy, which is clearly insufficient 
and not appropriate for achieving India’s energy security. The UPA itself  
recognized that the process to develop the nuclear industry and to produce 
nuclear energy would be a lengthy and a very expensive one. 
Energy security cannot be reduced to security of  supply nor circumscribed 
to one kind of  energy as presented in the India- US 123 agreement. It is impor-
tant to develop all forms of  energy, particularly renewable energy. In the case of  
India, wind energy has a promising future. Additionally, it is necessary to con-
sider other aspects such as the diversification of  imports, sustainability, energy 
efficiency, etc. to face the challenge India’s rapid growth presents. 
The policy makers behind the India-U.S. 123 agreement failed to con-
sider effective energy security tools to prevent, deter, contain or manage an 
energy threat. In this respect, the US commitments to supply or prevent 
nuclear fuel disruptions are non-binding and contingent on numerous po-
litical, legal, and technical factors. As a consequence, the supply of  fuel is 
not guaranteed. In this respect, the provisions of  the agreement contradict 
what was found in documents and public statements. 
Drawing on Haas´s compliance theories, it is likely that the US may decide 
not to comply with the energy security commitments made to India. Depend-
ing on the factor, the US is either not capable or unwilling to comply. Due to 
institutional factors such as regulation from international organizations (IAEA, 
NSG), it is more likely to expect compliance from India than from the US. In 
this sense, India is more subject to regulations than its counterpart. In addition, 
there is no reciprocity concerning rights and responsibilities. Contrary to what 
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was established in its preamble, the treaty is clearly not between equals. Concern-
ing international arbitration, the US for example, did not confer the same status 
and rights to India that it granted to Japan and to the European Union. The 
responsibilities of  the parties are not the same, and consequently the benefits 
are not reciprocal. While India made some commitments that are legally binding 
and permanent (e.g. the commitment to subject all its present and future civilian 
facilities to safeguards), the US´ obligations are either vague (e.g. the supply of  
nuclear fuel), subject to amendment (e.g. in the case of  sensitive nuclear tech-
nology), contingent on its domestic laws (e.g. dual-use items) or finite. For that 
reason, nuclear cooperation between the parties is not comprehensive. 
The US may have the capability and legitimacy to develop and enforce tech-
nical regulations, adjust its laws, collect taxes, and allocate resources to try to 
change the behavior of  the domestic constituencies affected (e.g. to persuade 
non-proliferation advocacy groups and citizens). However, as displayed in the 
commitments regarding energy security (e.g. Article Five), the US may not nec-
essarily have the will to comply. Its will to comply could be affected by important 
domestic actors concerned with the application of  the Hyde Act, as evidenced 
during the ratification process. What is more, national concern could substan-
tially increase if  India for example violates IAEA safeguard measures.
There is also the possibility that the US may be incapable of  supplying 
nuclear fuel, but still decide to try to comply while expecting others to assist 
it. For example, the American government may have difficulties in enforcing 
compliance on its nuclear companies, or may even need to deal with unex-
pected market failures, trade wars, etc. In those cases, the Article Five, Section 
Six (iv) of  the 123 Agreement entitles the US to call a group of  friendly sup-
plier countries to restore fuel supply to India. Furthermore, it may be the case 
that the American government envisages no political retributions for failing 
to comply with its energy-security-related commitments, and may still com-
mit to obligations it knows it cannot meet by itself. 
Since no domestic actors in the US would need to change their behavior 
after the implementation of  the 123 Agreement, compliance may nonethe-
less be at stake if, for example, India decides to conduct another nuclear test. 
Under that assumption, it would be likely to expect pressures from various 
American domestic actors demanding their government terminate nuclear 
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trade to abide by the normative values deemed important within that society. 
In the event of  a test, the nuclear companies themselves would be subject 
to similar pressure to terminate trade. Needless to say, the pressure could be 
amplified by international actors.
Additionally, the US decision to comply could be affected by the way the 
American administration learns to link its energy security commitments with 
other issues. This could happen if  the US follows the Hyde Act provisions 
and obliges India to support its policy of  containing Iran. In this manner, 
the US would be linking its choice to honor the agreement to compliance 
with its internal laws, hence affecting Indian energy security. Due to the large 
number of  actors responsible for the activities targeted, i.e. the supply of  fuel 
or regulation of  the action, it is reasonable to assume selective compliance 
from the US. Finally, the choice to comply with the 123 Agreement is legally 
prescribed by the Hyde Act, which is regarded by authorities of  that country 
as a superior and more influential law. 
The question of  Indian energy security is indeed a question with global 
repercussions. However it would be misleading to reduce the challenges 
India faces to a mere dependence on hydrocarbon fuels, as some scholars 
would have us believe. There are many other reasons why it is in the world´s 
interest to supply India with nuclear fuel on a stable, reliable and predict-
able basis. Most notable among them is nuclear proliferation in the event 
India stops following safeguard measures. Another one has to do with the 
damage it would inflict on the Indian development path, thus ultimately af-
fecting the world economy at large.
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